We develop a two-country model with an explicitly microfounded interbank market and sovereign default risk. Calibrated to the Euro Area, the model performs satisfactorily in matching key business cycle facts on real, financial and fiscal time series. We then use the model to assess the effects of a large crisis and quantify the potential effects of alternative unconventional policies on the dynamics of GDP, sovereign default risk and public indebtedness. We show that quantitative monetary easing is more efficient in stimulating GDP, while qualitative monetary easing relieves financial tensions and sovereign risk more efficiently. In terms of welfare, in the short run, unconventional monetary policies bring sizable welfare gains for households, while the long term effects are much smaller.
Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between interbank markets and default risk using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model, with a focus on the transmission of the recent financial crisis and unconventional monetary policies. Interbank markets are at the crossroad of financial and real spheres, as they match creditor and debtor banks. Their dynamics crucially affects the amount of credit in the economy, with effects on investment and GDP. They are also critical in the conduct of monetary policy, as Central Banks implement open market operations to control the interest rate in the overnight interbank market to affect the yield curve. As such, they play a central role in the transmission of monetary policy decisions, as well as in the transmission of potential financial crises.
However, despite their apparent importance, there are few widely accepted theoretical analysis about how the interbank market operates. This gap means that, Central Banks were unsure about how to react, when banks stopped lending to each other.
In addition, over the last fifteen years, European banks have increasingly owned government bonds of member countries. In particular, banks of the Core European countries such as France and Germany have gradually become major holders of the sovereign debt issued by Periphery countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. As shown by Guerrieri, Iacoviello and Minetti (2012) , who used combined data from the Bank for International Settlements and the Bank of France, the ratio of French banks' holdings of Periphery's sovereign debt over their holdings of French government debt was 56% in the last quarter of 2009, up from 19% in the first quarter of 2005. As a consequence, European banks were significantly exposed to the sovereign default risk of Periphery countries. This vicious spiral of twin crisis between banks and sovereigns imposes potential losses for banks who invested massively in the sovereign market, and resulted into banks' reduced ability and propensity to extend lending to the market.
The rising interdependence between interbank and sovereign bonds markets was at the heart of ECB's concerns about rising sovereign risk in the Euro Area. It was also partly exploited by ECB's unconventional monetary policies, to release tensions on both markets at the same time. To capture this interdependence, we develop a two-country model based on Guerrieri et al. (2012) , who study the international propagation of sovereign debt default, and add an interbank marketà la Dib (2010) . We quantify the effects of alternative unconventional monetary policies on financial variables (credit, lending rates), real variables (investment, GDP), fiscal variables (debt-to-GDP ratios, sovereign spreads). We also compute welfare losses/gains from the crisis and from the various policies, distinguishing between different types of agents (banks, households, entrepreneurs) . Concerning the sovereign risk channel, we differ from Guerrieri et al. (2012) and follow Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mueller (2013) , assuming that sovereign default risk is increasingly and positively related to a country's debt-to-GDP ratio. As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) , we restrict attention to a purely real model and focus on unconventional policies only.
For the banking sector, our model incorporates an optimizing banking sector with two types of monopolistically competitive banks in the interbank market: "Savings Banks" and "Borrowing Banks", supplying different banking services and transactions in the interbank market.
1 Savings Banks are financial intermediaries that are net lenders (creditors) in the interbank market, whereas Borrowing Banks are net borrowers (debtors). Banks have monopoly power when setting real deposit and prime lending rates. Savings Banks collect deposits from workers, set real deposit rates, and optimally choose the composition of their portfolio (composed of government bonds and risky interbank lending). Borrowing Banks borrow from Savings Banks in the interbank market and raise bank capital (equity) from bankers (shareholders) in the financial market to satisfy the capital requirement imposed by the regulation.
Further, following Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2006) and Dib (2010) , we assume endogenous strategic default on interbank borrowing. Finally, we introduce unconventional monetary policies in the model. Borrowing Banks can receive injections of money from the Central Bank to prevent freezes on the interbank market, a policy that we refer to as quantitative easing. We also consider a policy by which the Central Bank allows Borrowing Banks to swap a fraction of risky loans for government bonds, thereby improving their balance sheet. We refer to this policy as qualitative easing. We show that quantitative easing is more efficient in stimulating investment and GDP, while qualitative easing is a more effective option to relieve financial tensions and sovereign default risk. In terms of welfare, in the short run, unconventional monetary policies bring welfare gains for households, while the long term effects are much smaller for all types of agents.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the paper to the literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the calibration. Section 5 discusses the results and provides the welfare analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
There are very few studies on the joint frictions in the credit and sovereign markets.
The existing studies about the role of banks in global economies pay little attention on sovereign debt problems. Devereux and Yetman (2010) study a two-country economy in which investors hold domestic and foreign assets but are exposed to leverage constraints.
They find that if global financial markets are highly integrated, productivity shocks will be propagated through investors' financial portfolios, which will generate a strong output comovement. Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) So far, non of the mentioned contributions explores the impact of Central Bank's policy on the sovereign default risk through the interbank bank market, which is the main focus of our analysis. Our paper integrates sovereign risk, interbank market, and the Central Bank's unconventional monetary policy, and studies their joint interaction during a recession.
Model
The world economy consists of two countries, Core and Periphery. In each country there are infinitely-lived households, entrepreneurs (capital good producers), final good producers, and bankers. All agents of a given type are homogeneous. In addition, in each country there is a government that purchases final goods financing expenditure with debt and lump-sum taxes. There is one Central Bank in this two-country model, representing the ECB. The final good is produced using labor (non-tradable internationally) and capital.
Goods markets are competitive. The banking sector consists of two types of heterogeneous monopolistically competitive banks. We call them "savings" and "borrowing" banks, to indicate that they offer different banking services but interact in the interbank market. are assumed to be predetermined variables.
Households
We focus on the Periphery country and assume behavioral symmetry in the Core country.
Households maximize their expected discounted utility:
subject to 
Bankers
Bankers are the owners of the two types of banks, from which they receive profits. 
subject to
where 
(10)
Banks
The banking sector of each country consists of two types of heterogeneous profit-maximizing banks: the Savings Banks (SBs) and Borrowing Banks (BBs).
Savings Banks
Savings Banks (SBs) refer to all financial intermediaries that are net creditors (lenders) in interbank market. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive, profit-maximizing SBs indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). Each SB j collects fully insured deposits from workers D j,t and pays a deposit interest rate R D j,t , which is optimally set as a markdown over the marginal return of its assets.
The supply of deposits is given by
where υ D > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different types of deposits and D t is the total amount of deposits. SB j optimally allocates a fraction s j,t of deposits to lending in the domestic and foreign interbank markets that return R IB,C t and R
IB,P t
, respectively.
SB j also uses the remaining fraction 1−s j,t to purchase government bonds, both domestic and foreign. Lending on the interbank market is subject to a default probability δ D t and induces a quadratic monitoring cost
that depends on deviations of s j,t from a constant target s. The remaining fraction of deposits is allocated to bonds and split between domestic bonds and foreign bonds. These assets pay R that can also be interpreted as ex ante default probabilities in both countries.
Changing the composition of bonds portfolio incurs the payment of adjustment cost
Meanwhile, changing the composition of the portfolio of interbank lending incurs a similar adjustment cost:
Formally, the j th saving bank's optimization problem is max
where
and
subject to the constraints above.
In the definition of R 
Borrowing Banks
Borrowing Banks (BBs) refer to all net debtor (borrower) banks in the interbank market.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive BBs indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). BBs borrow from SBs in the interbank market and raise bank capital from bankers to satisfy the capital requirement. We assume that the stock of bank capital Z j,t is held by the BBs as government bonds in a portfolio with fraction δ We assume that BBs use the following Leontief technology to produce loans:
where κ j,t ≤ κ is bank j's leverage ratio and κ is the maximum leverage ratio imposed by regulators. X j,t is the amount of new assets swapped by the Central Bank. Γ t is a shock to the financial intermediation process affecting credit supply. Leontief technology implies perfect complementarity between interbank borrowing and bank capital, and imposes the capital requirement, which attenuates the real effects of different shocks. When lending to entrepreneurs, BB j faces the following demand function for loans:
where υ L > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different types of loans. The BB j optimally sets the prime lending rate, R L j,t , as a markup over the marginal cost of producing loans.
The j th BB's leverage ratio is given by κ j,t =
, which is subject to the maximum leverage ratio imposed by the regulators, κ. Whenever BBs have a lower-thantarget leverage ratio, they receive convex gains in the form of
Moreover, following Goodhart et al. (2006) , we allow BBs to optimally default on a fraction of their interbank borrowing, δ D j,t > 0. The default on interbank lending can be strategic or mandatory (when banks cannot afford to repay their debt). Nonetheless, it is costly for banks to default on the interbank borrowing. In this case, banks must pay convex penalties in the next period. The j th bank's penalty is given by
where χ δ D is a positive parameter determining the steady-state value of ∆ D j,t . Furthermore, we assume that borrowing banks bear the same adjustment cost as SBs when they adjust the holding of domestic and foreign government bonds.
The j th borrowing bank's optimization problem is thus
subject to equations listed above. In the symmetric equilibrium, where
The first-order conditions of this optimization problem are:
where Ω t is the marginal production cost of loans:
Entrepreneurs
In each country, there is a continuum of identical infinitely-lived entrepreneurs who borrow from local BBs, consume, and accumulate physical capital that depreciates at rate δ.
Entrepreneurs maximize their lifetime utility:
subject to the budget constraint:
denotes quadratic portfolio adjustment costs paid by the entrepreneurs to change the investment, and the holdings of loans. The investment I t is defined as:
In addition, entrepreneurs are subject to a constraint that limits their leverage to a constant fraction m of their capital holdings:
where the parameter ρ E captures the elasticity of the loan limit to the current capital choice of the entrepreneur. Therefore, the FOCs of the program are:
where λ t andλ t are the Lagrange multipliers for constraint (31) and (34).
Final Good Producers
The representative final good producer operates a Cobb-Douglas production function given
where Y t is the output of domestic final good, K t−1 is the capital stock rented from entrepreneurs at the rate, R K,t , N t is the labor input and A t is a stochastic process for productivity. Producers make zero profits because of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. With competitive factor market and profit maximizing producers, we have:
Governments
Government spending is financed through taxes on households, entrepreneurs, bankers and through debt. The government budget constraint in the Periphery country is
where G t is exogenous government spending, B t is the amount of government bonds issued in the Periphery. Public expenditure is financed at time t by raising taxes, issuing additional debt or partially defaulting on debt issued in the past.
We assume that government spending has a counter-cyclical component seeking to stabilize the business cycle. In addition, we impose a cut on government spending when the probability of default rises:
Sovereign Default Risk
There are mainly two strands of literatures about sovereign default. On one hand, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2008) and others have modeled default as a strategic decision of the government. On the other hand, Bi (2012) considers default as the consequence of the government's inability to raise funds used to honor its debt obligations.
Under both approaches, the probability of sovereign default is closely and non-linearly related to the level of public debt to GDP. We adopt the approach from Corsetti et al. (2013) , in which the ex ante probability of default, p t , at a certain level of sovereign indebtedness, b t = B t / (4Y t ), will be given by the cumulative distribution function of the beta distribution:
where b max denotes the upper end of the support for the debt-to-GDP ratio. We focus on the ex ante probability of sovereign default, because the ex ante default risk is crucial for the pricing of government debt.
Equilibrium
We assume that the Core country is characterized by similar equilibrium conditions. An equilibrium is defined as a sequence of prices and quantities such that all agents solve their optimization problems, and that prices clear the markets:
1. Production factor markets 2. Loan markets 3. Bank capital markets
4. The goods market
6. Sovereign debt markets
Shock Processes
The economy is subject to productivity, government expenditure, interbank tension, conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks.
Government spending shock is given by equation (39). The left structural shocks follow AR(1) processes:
where Λ t = {A t , Γ t , M t , X t }; Λ ≥ 0 is the steady-state value of Λ t ; ρ Λ ∈ (0, 1); and
Calibration
We calibrate the model to the Euro Area. The time unit is a quarter. The Periphery comprises Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain while the Core is made of remaining members of the monetary union. We choose the Households' discount factor, β H , to be symmetric and equal to 0.9975, implying an annual real interest rate on deposits of 1%. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is η = 2. The discount factors of bankers and entrepreneurs are set equal to 0.997 and 0.99, respectively.
On the production side, the depreciation rate δ is 0.03 and the capital share in production α is 0.33. We set investment adjustment costs φ E I = 2.5 to match the relative volatility (standard deviation) of investment as much as possible. Entrepreneurs also pay a convex cost for adjusting loans; we set φ E L = 0.05 as in Guerrieri et al. (2012) . We set the parameter governing entrepreneurs' working capital constraint ρ E = 0.75. m is chosen so that its value matches the ratio of outstanding loans over capital stocks.
Moving to the government, the debt ceiling parameterb is 3.4 for the Periphery bloc and 2.4 for the Core bloc. These choices imply a debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 0.85 in the Periphery and 0.6 in the Core, in line with data from the IMF Economic Outlook for 2010.
Steady-state tax rates are calibrated to represent 45% of the consumption of each type of agent and remain constant over simulations. In terms of sovereign default risk, we follow Corsetti et al. (2013) , and choose parameters α b g = 3.70, β b g = 0.54, b max = 2.56. In the public spending process, we assume a ρ B = 0.81 persistence, the coefficient on default risk is γ = 0.025 in the Core and γ = 0.05 in the Periphery, and the coefficient on output is σ = 0.25 in the Core and σ = 0 in the Periphery. Those different coefficient are set to match differences in cyclical patterns of public spending between the Core and Periphery, as well as sovereign spread volatilities.
Households pay a cost for adjusting deposits, we set φ D = 0.05. In the banker's problem, the parameter measuring the convexity of the adjusting cost function, φ B , denote how costly it is for the bankers to adjust domestic and foreign bonds: we set φ B = 0.01.
To apportion the steady-state holdings of government debt to households, Periphery and Core banks, we adopt the calibration in Guerrieri et al. (2012) , i.e. 41.7% the share of public debt of the Periphery is held by the Core bloc, 18.8% is held by Periphery households, and 39.5% is allocated to Periphery banks. For the Core government debt, 11% of their collective sovereign debt is held by households in Core countries, and 70% of the total is assigned to Core banks.
In the interbank sector, the parameter χ s determines the ratio of bank lending to total assets held by the savings banks s t . It is set so that the steady-state value of s t is equal to 0.64 for the Periphery and 0.86 for the Core, which corresponds to the historical ratio observed in the data 5 . The parameter χ κ is set so that we could have a reasonable value for ν L , i.e. around 4.
Based on the Basel II minimum required bank capital ratio of 8%, we assume that the maximum imposed bank leverage,κ, is 5.36 for Periphery and 4.03 for Core 6 . Similarly, we calibrate χ δ D , the parameter determining the total cost of banks' defaults on interbank borrowing, so that the probability of default in the interbank market equals to 0.2% in annual term.
The parameters ν D and ν L , which measure the degrees of monopoly power of savings and Borrowing banks, are set to match the historical averages of real deposit and loan rates, R D and R L . Table 1 summarizes the parameterization and shows the implied steady-state value of key variables in the model. 
Simulations
In this section we run two types of exercises. First, we compute the business cycle moments induced by the model and compare them to the key business cycle moments in the Euro Area. Second, we run non-linear simulations of the model to assess the impact of quantitative and qualitative easing policies followed by the ECB during the crisis. 7 The idea is to compare the relative efficiency of alternative interventions both on the interbank and the sovereign debt markets. We also introduce a scenario when the market treats Core government bond as "safe" asset, i.e. a safe haven. The last part of the section proceeds to a welfare analysis of each policy.
Business Cycle Moments
We first report the business cycle properties of the economy when driven by three types of shocks: productivity shocks, financial shocks and public spending shocks. Our calibration for those shocks follows Dib (2010) Table 2 .
Business cycle moments concerning GDP and its main components (consumption, investment and public spending) are correctly reproduced. GDP is more volatile in the Periphery than in the Core. The relative volatility of consumption is less than one in the Core and close to one in the Periphery. The relative volatility of investment is higher in the Core than in the Periphery, although its level is a bit larger than in the data. 8 The relative volatility of public spending is perfectly matched with data but the latter was 7 So far, the most important instrument from ECB is the reverse transaction (applicable on the basis of repurchase agreements or collateralized loans). Its influence on the economy should be a mix of the quantitative and qualitative monetary easing.
8 A calibration abstracting from financial shocks allows to match those moments almost exactly. used as a target to calibrate public spending shocks. In terms of persistence, the model produces a little bit less persistence than observed in the data, especially for investment and consumption. Comovements are reproduced at least qualitatively, although investment is less pro-cyclical than consumption while the opposite pattern characterizes the data. Public spending is weakly counter-cyclical in the Core while weakly pro-cyclical in the Periphery, as observed in the data.
Turning to financial variables, the model matches well the volatility of interbank interest rates, but the predicted persistence are too low and the correlation with GDP are negative which is at odds with data. In terms of variance decomposition, the model is mainly driven by productivity shocks and the latter induce a negative correlation between interest rates and GDP, while standard RBC models predict a positive one. In the model, the collateral constraint applied to entrepreneurs disconnects the dynamics of capital accumulation from its marginal productivity, and ties the latter to the quantity of loans. After a positive productivity shock, output rises, as well as deposits, so the liquidity in interbank markets increases as well, allowing saving banks to offer lower deposit rates. This increase in interbank liquidity lowers the marginal production cost of loans, and then the lending rate, which raises demand for loans, and thus the capital stock. This mechanism also explains why the model produces a positive correlation between the loans (or deposits) to GDP ratio and the interbank interest rate. Loans to GDP and deposits to GDP ratios are slightly more volatile than output but not as much as in the data; the correlation with GDP is strong and negative while weak and mixed in the data. The negative correlation of interest rates with GDP is mainly responsible for this counterfactual cyclical behavior.
Finally, moments related to public finance are correctly matched. The volatilities of sovereign rates and sovereign spreads are close to data, although slightly more volatile especially for sovereign spreads. 9 Volatility of debt to GDP ratio is smaller than in data but the model produces a more volatile ratio for the Periphery, which is in line with the data.
In terms of the correlation with GDP, sovereign rates and GDP are negatively correlated in the model, which is at odds with data. Sovereign spreads are strongly and negatively correlated with GDP while this correlation is weaker in the data. The correlation between sovereign debt and GDP is negative as in the data. Finally, the correlation between loans to GDP and interbank interest rate is positive, corresponding to what we observed in the data. Other correlations, especially the correlation between sovereign rates and debt to GDP ratio (or between sovereign rates and public spending) could arguably be better matched.
Overall, however, the model does a satisfactory job in matching so many key business cycle facts on real, financial and fiscal time series. We consider it as reliable enough to perform additional simulations to quantify the effects of the Great recession and unconventional monetary policies on key aggregates and welfare.
The Great Recession and Central Bank Interventions
We start our analysis with the benchmark scenario were a large recession is simulated feeding the model with negative TFP shocks. Although it is clear that the great recession was not caused by negative TFP shocks, the latter induce changes in macroeconomic aggregates that match particularly well the observed patterns. In addition, according to Meza and Quintin (2007) , TFP falls remarkably during financial crises, while changes in capital stock and labor hoarding are only secondary roles. what is observed in the data. The fall in GDP raises mechanically debt-to-GDP ratios above their steady-state levels by more than 4pp in the Periphery and 3pp in the Core.
The automatic component of public spending aimed at stabilizing GDP further feeds the rise in debt to GDP ratios. As a consequence default risk rises in both countries, but more markedly for the Periphery, explaining the rise in sovereign spreads.
We then consider three possible interventions from the Central Bank: Normally, central banks use this instrument to determine the overnight interest rate.
In reality, banks can use these cash either to replenish their tier 1 capital, or to provide loans. Considering both possibilities would complicate our analysis. Therefore, we assume that banks are forced by the contract to make loans. In other words, central bank inject money to banks and let them lend to entrepreneurs.
2. Qualitative Monetary Easing. When banks face the deterioration of loan quality, the Central Bank can help them improve their balance sheet strength by allowing these banks to swap a fraction of risky loans for government bonds. In this way, banks' balance sheets are improved. This policy is quite different because the transmission mechanism does not go through loans directly but through bonds markets.
However this policy will also affect loans through a variety of channels. First, qualitative monetary easing will release the tensions on sovereign markets, lowering the return on bank capital and therefore the marginal production cost of loans. Second, because the loan production function has a Leontief technology, producing loans requires a good capitalization of bank and good conditions on the interbank market. As a consequence, an intervention of the very same size could in principle have similar effects on GDP and other key macroeconomic variables. This operation allowed banks to replace their risky Periphery bonds by Core bonds.
In our model, this scenario is modeled with a temporary shock on δ 
Welfare Analysis
From the experiments above we compute the welfare losses from the Great Recession in comparison to a situation where the economy would have remained in the steady-state, and the welfare gains from the three unconventional monetary policies. In each country, we compute the welfare gains/losses for households, bankers and entrepreneurs. The computation is made either using 30 quarters after the beginning of the recession (for short term analysis), or 200 quarters after the recession (for long term analysis). Table   3 reports the results of the three policies, for each type of agent in both regions of the monetary union. In the short run, Table 3 shows that the recession generates large welfare losses for households (between 0.68% and 0.86%) and very large losses for entrepreneurs (between 10% and 12%) while welfare gains for bankers. However, given the small importance of bankers consumptions in aggregate consumption (only 3% of total consumption), the average welfare effect is around 3% of steady-state consumption. The welfare loss for entrepreneurs is larger in the Periphery but the welfare loss for households is larger in the Core. The effects of unconventional monetary policies in the short run are small and yield welfare gains for households in both the Core and the Periphery. Quantitative easing and QE with safe haven produce important welfare gains for entrepreneurs in the Core (around 0.13%) but welfare losses for bankers in both countries. The effects of QE with safe haven is very similar to a standard quantitative monetary easing, except that at the presence of safe haven, households and entrepreneurs gain more in the Core but less in the Periphery. This is due to unbalanced investment in Core government bonds that brings excess of welfare to the Core agents. The qualitative monetary easing has small and mixed effects on bankers, while brings large welfare losses to entrepreneurs in the Periphery country (around 0.3%). The average effects of unconventional monetary policies is globally small (around 0.02% of steady-state consumption) and mostly negative.
Long run effects are much smaller, as gaps from the steady-state are progressively closed over time. Qualitatively however, most results applying to the short run are preserved, except that quantitative easing brings welfare losses to entrepreneurs in the Periphery, and that qualitative easing brings small welfare losses to households in the Periphery. In the long run, quantitative easing and QE with safe haven bring welfare gains to households, and welfare losses to bankers. Quantitatively however, the welfare effects of unconventional monetary policies in the long run remain quite small, close to negligible.
Conclusion
Our results imply that Central Bank's intervention can be beneficial during a recession:
both quantitative and qualitative monetary easing help alleviate output decline, relieve financial tensions (including interbank, credit market, and sovereign interest rates), and reduce sovereign default risk. Particularly, quantitative monetary easing is more efficient in stimulating output; and qualitative monetary easing is a good choice to limit sovereign risk. The presence of a safe haven tends to partially neutralize the benefit of QE on Periphery's sovereign problem, due to the misleading belief in "safe" assets. where the rate is transformed to percent per quarter. The correlation with output is calculated against an aggregate measure of GDP for the Euro Area.
• (c) Loans to GDP and Deposits to GDP are build using quarterly OECD data on sectoral financial accounts for financial agents and institutions from 1999Q01 to 2013Q3. Loans and Deposits are nominal so country-specific GDP deflators are used to get real quantities. The resulting time series are then divided by quarterly GDP. The log of ratios is taken and HP-filtered. Core denotes average moments for
Belgium and France, and Periphery denotes average moments for Italy and Spain.
Standard deviations are 100 times the standard deviation of the ratio.
• (d) Sovereign long term rates are the 10-years yield in percent per annum on sovereign bonds taken from the OECD financial database and debt to GDP ratios are build using quarterly data on Gross Nominal Debt, deflating total debt using GDP deflators and dividing by quarterly GDP in annual levels. The dataset goes from 2000Q01 to 2011Q04. Rates are transformed as the short-term interest rate. Spreads are computed against German rates, and treated as other rates, i.e. transformed to quarterly rates and considered as the log of one plus the rate before HP-filtering and computing moments. Core denotes average moments for Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands and Periphery denotes average moments for Portugal and Spain.
• (e) Interest rates are MFI interest rates on outstanding amounts of euro-denominated deposits and loans by euro area residents in percent per annum taken from the ECB database. Loans are up to 1 year to non-financial institutions, and deposits are up to 2 years from households. The dataset goes from 2003Q01 to 2014Q01. Rates are transformed as the short-term interest rate, and are considered as the log of one plus the rate before HP-filtering and computing moments. The correlation with output is calculated against an aggregate measure of GDP for the Euro Area.
